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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Margaret and Charles Farris appeal from an order of the 
District Court denying their motion, made pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(b), to set aside a settlement reached in and 
the resulting dismissal of a diversity action filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 
This appeal requires us to predict whether, in the 
particular circumstances presented here, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would invoke the doctrine of apparent 
authority to enforce a settlement entered into by an 
attorney lacking actual authority to settle the case. We 
addressed a similar, although not identical, issue in 
Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir. 1991). We revisit 
this area of the law in order to clarify our view of the 
doctrine of apparent authority with respect to matters of 
settlement in Pennsylvania. Because we predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not apply the doctrine 
to enforce the settlement in this case, we will reverse the 





The facts underlying this appeal are straightforward and 
uncontested. We recount these facts in detail because the 
events leading up to the contested settlement and those 
immediately following the court's "acceptance" of the 
settlement are crucial to the legal issues involved. 
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On April 15, 1995, Margaret Farris was injured in a fall 
at the J.C. Penney store in downtown Philadelphia. She 
alleges that her injuries were sustained when she was 
restrained by Penney's employees and falsely accused of 
shoplifting. Farris and her husband Charles hired attorney 
Timothy Booker to represent them in connection with the 
incident, agreeing to pay him a 40% contingent fee. Booker 
filed suit on behalf of the Farrises on November 28, 1995, 
in federal court. 
 
A trial, bifurcated with respect to liability and damages, 
began before the judge and jury on September 24, 1996. At 
about noon on the second day of trial, settlement 
discussions began.1 Booker and the Farrises met with the 
trial judge alone. The judge then met with attorney Renee 
Berger, counsel for J.C. Penney. Later that day, in a 
meeting with both Booker and Berger, the judge asked 
Berger if J.C. Penney would authorize her to settle the case 
for $20,000. After receiving assurance from the judge that 
$20,000 would indeed settle the matter, Berger secured the 
necessary authority and communicated that fact to Booker. 
Ms. Berger then saw Booker enter a witness room with Mrs. 
Farris where the two remained for about five minutes. At 
some later point Booker informed Berger that the $20,000 
settlement offer had been accepted. In fact, neither of the 
Farrises authorized Booker to accept the offer. To the 
contrary, Margaret Farris had told Booker that she did not 
want the case to be settled until her medical treatment was 
complete. 
 
Nonetheless, the $20,000 settlement figure was 
communicated to the judge. When court reconvened in the 
afternoon of September 25, the record establishes the 
following exchange: 
 
       The Court:  Good afternoon. What can I do for you? 
 
       Ms. Berger: Your Honor, we have resolved this 
                   matter for $20,000. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court found that as of the time of these discussions, 
Booker had not taken steps to secure expert testimony bearing on 
damages. 
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       The Court:  Do you want to get anything on the 
                   record? 
 
       Ms. Berger: Yes. I would like to just get it on the 
                   record that we have agreed to settle this 
                   matter for $20,000. 
 
       The Court   Defendant will pay $20,000? 
 
       Ms. Berger: Will pay $20,000 to Plaintiff. The 
                   Plaintiffs will be responsible for all 
                   medical bills and Plaintiffs' costs and 
                   Defendant will be -- 
 
       The Court:  Total settlement of $20,000? 
 
       Ms. Berger: That is correct. 
 
       The Court:  Is that correct Mr. Booker? 
 
       Mr. Booker: Yes. 
 
       The Court:  I notice the plaintiffs are present in 
                   court. 
 
The jury was summoned, received the thanks of the court, 
and was discharged. The entire in-court proceeding with 
respect to the settlement lasted approximately three 
minutes and the District Court later found that Mrs. Farris 
either did not hear or did not understand what was 
happening until after the jury had been dismissed. 
 
Following discharge of the jury, the Farrises left the 
courtroom with Booker. Crying, Margaret Farris asked 
Booker, "Why did you do this to me?" Mrs. Farris testified 
that Booker's response was, "One day you'll thank me." 
Within minutes of this exchange, Margaret Farris re- 
entered the courtroom where Ms. Berger stood conferring 
with a number of the jurors. Mrs. Farris told Ms. Berger 
that she had never authorized Booker to settle the case. 
Berger confirmed Margaret Farris's account. 
 
On September 26, 1996, the trial judge entered an order 
dismissing the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.1(b). 
Berger prepared a general release setting forth the terms of 
the settlement and transmitted it to Booker. Because the 
Farrises declined to sign the release, the settlement check 
was never issued. Booker sought to have the settlement 
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proceeds disbursed without a signed release but Berger 
refused. On October 7, 1996, Booker filed a motion to 
enforce the settlement. In November of 1996, Booker was 
discharged as attorney for the Farrises. 
 
Richard P. Abraham, Esq., replaced Booker as counsel 
for the Farrises. On January 13, 1997, a hearing was held 
on the motion to enforce the settlement. The trial judge 
recused himself and the matter was reassigned. On 
January 24, 1997, while the motion to enforce settlement 
was pending, Abraham filed a motion pursuant to Rule 
60(b) for relief from dismissal. At an evidentiary hearing on 
February 5, 1998, the District Court heard testimony from 
Booker, Berger and the Farrises. On April 15, 1998, the 
Court issued a Memorandum and Order denying the 
Farrises' Rule 60(b) motion and upholding the settlement. 
The District Court based its decision on the doctrine of 
apparent authority, holding that Pennsylvania law 
recognized the doctrine and that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would find that the circumstances of this case 




The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never invoked the 
doctrine of apparent authority to enforce a settlement 
entered into by an attorney who lacks actual authority to 
settle a matter. At best, the court has left the applicability 
of the doctrine open, seeming to suggest in Rothman v. 
Fillette, 469 A.2d 543 (Pa. 1983), that apparent authority 
might be used to enforce a settlement given the right set of 
facts. In Rothman, the plaintiffs filed suit to recover 
damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 
Following negotiations with the Rothmans' insurer, the 
Rothmans' attorney received a check for $7,000. The facts 
showed that the Rothmans' attorney, acting without his 
clients' knowledge or consent, forged the Rothman 
signature on the settlement agreement and the check and 
misappropriated the settlement proceeds. On instructions 
of the Rothmans' attorney, the pending personal injury 
action was marked settled and discontinued. 
 
Some five years later, the Rothmans filed a petition to 
remove the order discontinuing the case. The trial court 
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granted the petition and reinstated the action. Reversing, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote: 
 
       At the outset it must be understood that under the 
       facts of this case there is no question of an implied or 
       an apparent agency. The law in this jurisdiction is 
       quite clear that an attorney must have express 
       authority to settle a cause of action of the client.2 
 
469 A.2d 545. 
 
The only direct endorsement of apparent authority in 
Pennsylvania is set forth in an intermediate appellate court 
decision, Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 149 A.2d 
498 (Pa. Super. 1959). There, the Sustriks' attorney 
negotiated a settlement agreement with the defendants, 
accepted a check in full settlement, and dismissed the 
Sustriks' claim. When the settlement check and 
accompanying release were delivered to the Sustriks, 
however, they refused to accept either, alleging that their 
attorney lacked authority to settle the matter. The Sustriks' 
request to reopen and to vacate the settlement was denied. 
Affirming the denial, the Superior Court stated the general 
rule that: 
 
       [T]he act of an agent or attorney affecting the relation 
       of his principal or client, with a third person, done in 
       accordance with his principal's manifestations of 
       consent although without special authority, may bind 
       his principal or client. 
 
149 A.2d at 499. The court found that the Sustriks had 
manifested their consent to the settlement: 
 
       The lower court was justified in concluding that the 
       plaintiffs' conduct in connection with settlement and 
       discontinuance clearly clothed their counsel with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Other Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases reiterate the need for 
express authority. See Starling v. West Erie Ave. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 3 
A.2d 387 (Pa. 1939) (noting that Pennsylvania has never utilized 
"apparent authority" as grounds to enforce settlement entered into by 
attorney without express authority); Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 
87 A.2d 192 (Pa. 1952); and Senyshyn v. Karlak, 299 A.2d 294 (Pa. 
1973) (stating that attorney cannot settle litigation without express 
authority). 
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       authority to settle the case upon principles of apparent 
       authority. . . . 
 




We considered the Rothman and Sustrik decisions in our 
opinion interpreting the doctrine of apparent authority 
under Pennsylvania law in Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d at 
1024. Tiernan involved a challenge to an order of the 
District Court granting summary enforcement of several 
settlement agreements. Our decision turned on "the nature 
and extent of the authority that plaintiffs gave their 
attorney and on his conduct towards the district court and 
other parties to the litigation." Id. at 1028. We proceeded on 
the assumption that the plaintiffs' attorney lacked actual 
authority to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of 
his clients. We explored, therefore, whether Pennsylvania 
law recognized an alternative source of authority upon 
which the defendants could rely to enforce the settlement. 
 
Looking first to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
statements in Rothman, we concluded that the Court's 
reasoning "suggest[ed] that [it] was reluctant to rule out 
completely the availability of [implied or apparent] authority 
in Pennsylvania." 923 F.3d at 1034. The apparent 
reservation of the doctrine in Rothman combined with the 
endorsement of the doctrine by the intermediate appellate 
court in Sustrick, convinced us to write in the Tiernan 
opinion: "[W] e believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court might allow implied actual or apparent authority to 
suffice in an appropriate case.". 923 F.3d at 1035.3 
 
In the matter now before us, the District Court, in the 




3. We balanced this conclusion with an acknowledgment that: 
 
       [T]his area is clouded somewhat by the fact that the Pennsylvania 
       Supreme Court has on occasion stated without qualification that 
       "[a]n attorney cannot, absent express authority, settle 
litigation." 
 
Id. at 1034. 
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       I read [Tiernan] to permit enforcement of a settlement 
       where apparent authority is present. [J.C. Penney] 
       reasonably interpreted the Farrises' actions on 
       September 21, 1996 -- specifically, seeing the Farrises 
       and Booker enter Judge Fullam's chambers, seeing 
       Booker enter the witness room with his clients after the 
       $20,000 offer was communicated, and seeing the 
       Farrises at the counsel table as the settlement was 
       read into the record, to mean that they [the Farrises] 
       had given authorization to Booker to settle their case 
       for $20,000. These manifestations by the Farrises to 
       defendant's counsel cloaked Booker with apparent 
       authority sufficient to uphold the settlement. Whether 
       or not Booker exceeded his authority as the Farrises 
       attorney (and the credible evidence makes plain that he 
       did), the record contains both words and actions by 
       both Booker and the Farrises sufficient to support 
       defendant's reasonable conclusion that a settlement 
       had been reached. 
 
2 F. Supp.2d at 700. According to the District Court, J.C. 
Penney is "entitled to finality with regard to an agreement 
it reasonably entered into over eighteen months ago; the 
Farrises may pursue their dissatisfaction with their 
attorney in another forum." Id. 
 
We are convinced that the District Court's reliance on 
Tiernan in predicting that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would here recognize an exception to the 
general rule requiring that an attorney have actual 
authority to settle was misplaced. Ultimately, our 
discussion in Tiernan of Pennsylvania law with respect to 
apparent authority was in dicta: 
 
       [W]e believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
       might allow . . . apparent authority to suffice. We do 
       not believe, however, that [this] ground is so clearly 
       available in this case to justify summary enforcement 
       of the settlement agreements. Furthermore, we 
       emphasize the general rule that an attorney cannot 
       settle his client's case without express actual authority. 
 
Id. at 1035. 
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The District Court extrapolated from the dicta in Tiernan 
and predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
invoke the doctrine of apparent authority to enforce the 
settlement at issue in this case. While we reiterate our 
conclusion in Tiernan that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania may recognize apparent authority in some 
case, it has yet to do so and we are not convinced that the 





Our discussions of apparent authority in the context of 
Pennsylvania law and the law generally have emphasized 
that whether the doctrine applies depends upon the client's 
conduct. In Tiernan, we explained that: 
 
       Apparent authority . . . has as its source the client's 
       conduct toward another party in the litigation. It arises 
       from a principal's manifestations to a third party that 
       any agent has authority to act on the principal's 
       behalf. See Restatement (Second) of Agency S 8 (1958). 
 
923 F.2d at 1034. 
 
We again stressed the fact-dependent nature of the 
doctrine of apparent authority in Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 
F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986). In Edwards, the plaintiffs appealed 
a District Court order enforcing a settlement agreement 
entered into by the Edwardses' attorney. The Edwardses 
contended that their attorney lacked actual authority to 
settle the case. Because Virgin Islands law was devoid of 
statute or precedent governing the issue of an attorney's 
authority to settle a client's action, we looked to principles 
of agency law and "common law rules `as generally 
understood and applied in the United States' " in 
accordance with V.I. Code Ann. Tit. 1, S 4. Id. at 389-90. 
Applying those principles in evaluating the Edwardses' 
claims, we noted first that: 
 
       A strong public policy exists in favor of settlements. 
       Such a settlement, once entered, may be set aside only 
       if the client produces "proof that the attorney had no 
       right to consent to its entry." 
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Id. at 389 (quoting Surety Insurance Co. of California v. 
Williams, 729 F.2d 581, 582-83 (8th Cir. 1984). We then 
considered the applicability of apparent authority, writing 
that "there is no consensus" on the doctrine but finding 
that its applicability represents "the better rule": 
 
       [E]nforcing settlement agreements on the basis of 
       apparent authority is consistent with the principles of 
       agency law, the policies favoring settlements generally, 
       and the notions of fairness to the parties in the 
       adjudicatory process. 
 
Id. at 390. In finding that apparent authority could be 
invoked to validate a settlement we emphasized that the 
"crucial question in ascertaining whether apparent 
authority has been created is whether the principal has 
made representations concerning the agent's authority to 
the third party." Id. Evaluating the facts in Edwards, we 
concluded that 
 
       Apparent authority is an equitable doctrine that places 
       the loss on one whose manifestations to another have 
       misled the latter. We agree with the [Edwardses] that 
       the record is devoid of communications directly from 
       the [Edwardses] to defense counsel, much less 
       representations that might have led defense counsel to 
       believe that Groner had the Edwardses' permission to 
       settle. 
 
Id. at 391. 
 
In Edwards, we thus declined to rely on apparent 
authority even though: 1) the attorney in question had been 
the Edwardses' attorney since the beginning of the case and 
had transmitted all communications from the defendants to 
the Edwardses; (2) pretrial conference orders required the 
attorneys to appear with authority to settle; and (3) the 
attorney had been authorized to select medical experts to 
prepare for the trial. 
 
The Tiernan and Edwards decisions, taken together, 
establish that in order for the doctrine of apparent 
authority to apply, the facts must show that the plaintiffs 
(principals) communicated directly with defense counsel, 
making representations that would lead defense counsel to 
 
                                10 
  
believe that the plaintiffs' attorney had authority to settle 
the case. The District Court in the matter now before us 
grounded its invocation of apparent authority on two 
findings: (1) the Farrises were seen conferring with their 
attorney during the course of settlement negations; and (2) 
the Farrises were silent during the in-court announcement 
of the settlement and dismissal of their cases. 
 
The Farrises in-court conduct is the linchpin of this case. 
Normally in-court silence during the reading or entry of a 
settlement would be a powerful indicator that the particular 
settlement terms were authorized. The unique facts of this 
case, however, negate the evidentiary force of the Farrises' 
silence. 
 
The District Court, making findings of fact, noted that the 
entire in-court proceeding from discussion of the settlement 
through dismissal of the jury lasted less than three 
minutes. The Court also found that Mrs. Farris either did 
not understand or did not hear what was happening during 
those three minutes. Moreover, had J.C. Penney construed 
Farrises' silence as a manifestation of authority, it was 
immediately disabused of that notion. As soon as  the 
proceedings were concluded, Mrs. Farris expressed her 
surprise with and opposition to the settlement both to her 
own attorney and to counsel for J.C. Penney.4 J.C. Penney 
was on notice immediately that the settlement was not 
authorized and has never paid any amount to anyone as a 
result of the settlement.5 
 
Where, as here, the District Court found that Booker was 
never authorized to settle on behalf of his client, there is a 
credible explanation for the client's silence, and the client 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Had there been any manifestation of authority sufficient to support 
the doctrine of apparent authority, that manifestation was promptly 
repudiated. The general rule is that a principal may promptly repudiate 
an agent's acts, apparent authority notwithstanding. See Tiernan, 923 
F.2d at 1037; Sustrik, 149 A.2d at 501. 
 
5. While we recognize that J.C. Penney suffered at least some degree of 
prejudice as a result of events surrounding the purported settlement, we 
note that counsel, at oral argument, conceded that he is not aware of 
any impediment which would prevent his client from proceeding to trial 
in this matter. 
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made all parties aware of the lack of authority immediately 
upon learning what had happened, we are convinced that 
these equities lie with the Farrises and that the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania would not rely on the doctrine of 
apparent authority to enforce the settlement. This 
conclusion is consistent with our own caselaw and the law 
of Pennsylvania. 
 
The particular facts supporting our conclusion are 
unlikely to arise often. This is not the "typical" case where 
a client has acted to create an ambiguity with respect to the 
attorney's authority, where she has delayed in asserting the 
lack of authority, or where it is clear that the real motive for 
challenging a settlement involves a change of heart 




In predicting how a matter would be decided under state 
law we take into consideration the District Court's analysis 
and also examine: 
 
       (1) what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said in 
       related areas; (2) the decisional law of the Pennsylvania 
       intermediate courts; (3) federal appeals and district 
       court cases interpreting the state law; (4) decisions 
       from other jurisdictions that have discussed the issues 
       we face here. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For decisions resting on these more "typical" grounds, see Jones v. 
Stedman, 595 So.2d 1355 (Ala. 1992) (ordering enforcement of 
settlement where challenger sat silently while settlement was read into 
the record and later argued that by her silence she conveyed 
disagreement with the settlement); Moreland v. Suttmiller, 397 S.E.2d 
910 (W. Va. 1990)(ordering settlement enforced where record showed 
that petitioners vacillated between granting and revoking attorney's 
authority to settle and real reservations seemed to relate to belief that 
they had settled for inadequate amount); Sunn v. Mercury Marine, 305 
S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1983)(enforcing settlement where client was silent when 
settlement was read and failed to object to settlement or to attorney's 
continued appearance on his behalf); Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 
N.E.2d 1209 (Ill. App. 1982)(enforcing settlement where petitioners were 
present and failed to object in a meeting where their counsel informed 
opposing counsel that the terms of settlement were accepted). 
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Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Taking all of these authorities into account, we predict 
that while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might, in some 
as yet undefined case, apply the doctrine of apparent 
authority to uphold a disputed settlement, it would not do 
so here. Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the 
District Court denying the motion to set aside the 
settlement entered and will remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
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NYGAARD, J., Concurring. 
 
I concur in the judgment. I believe, however, that it is 
neither necessary nor desirable that we predict whether the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize apparent 
authority in this odd situation, because as the majority 
opinion makes clear, Farris learned of the settlement 
agreement within minutes and immediately repudiated it. 
Under these facts, I view this as a contemporaneous 
repudiation of whatever agreement her attorney reached 
with counsel for the defendant. 
 
Alternatively, I would suggest that we certify the apparent 
authority issue to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for it to 
decide. In Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 70 F.3d 
291, 304 (3rd Cir. 1995), we said that an issue should be 
certified to the state court "when: (1) the issue is one of 
importance; (2) it may be determinative of the litigation; 
and, (3) state law does not provide controlling precedent 
through which the federal court could resolve the issue." I 
think this case qualifies. In any event, I would avoid 
making the prediction. 
 
A True Copy: 
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